U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) – Antitrust Division Federal Trade Commission (FTC)

None directly—this is a nonbinding interpretive standard, not a CFR provision. The consumer welfare doctrine has been applied through agency enforcement posture and judicial deference, not through formal rulemaking.

Interpretive Antitrust Enforcement Standard Based on “Consumer Welfare”

The “consumer welfare” standard defines antitrust harm almost exclusively in terms of short-term price effects, ignoring harms to labor markets, innovation, and democracy. It has allowed corporations to suppress wages, eliminate suppliers, and monopolize data—all while passing superficial price benefits to consumers. Rescinding this interpretive framework would re-center antitrust enforcement on preserving competitive market structures and economic liberty.

Federal Trade Commission 600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20580

FTC: (202) 326-2045 · antitrust@ftc.gov DOJ Antitrust Division: (202) 514-2481

Since the 1980s, U.S. antitrust policy has been guided by the “consumer welfare” standard—an interpretation popularized by Chicago School economists and endorsed by courts. This doctrine limits antitrust action to cases where mergers or conduct directly cause consumer prices to rise. It explicitly deprioritizes concerns about worker exploitation, market power, supply chain chokeholds, and democratic resilience. This narrow interpretation was never required by statute and has eroded the ability of enforcement agencies to preserve truly competitive markets.

The consumer welfare standard has become a shield for monopolistic behavior. It permits firms to dominate markets, vertically integrate across sectors, and retaliate against workers—as long as prices remain stable. This ignores the many ways power is exercised in modern markets: through wage suppression, lock-in, data extraction, and exclusionary conduct. Rescinding the standard as an interpretive rule would give antitrust enforcers the latitude to challenge consolidation that harms workers, suppliers, innovation, and long-term market health.

No CFR changes are required. This interpretive rescission would result in official DOJ and FTC guidance withdrawing endorsement of the consumer welfare standard. New policy statements would clarify that harm to competition includes labor market effects, supplier exclusion, reduced innovation, and structural concentration—even absent price increases.

Andrew Ferguson

Chair, Federal Trade Commission